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Public Participation and Shaping Urban Development: The Case of New 
Atlantic Yard Nets Arena Project in Brooklyn 
Communities throughout New York City are facing unprecedented development 
pressure as the city's population and economic growth continue. These 
pressures are exacerbated by environmental damages to neighborhoods in the 
past and by potential future stresses. Many communities lack the resources to 
hire the technical expertise necessary to influence development activities in their 
neighborhoods. They find themselves overwhelmed by the resources that 
developers can devote to developing plans and proposals. 
Environmental impact assessments of proposed projects are required by law, 
and New York City provides significant opportunities for public participation in 
development processes. Developers have become expert at tapping into a . 
network of ex~ertise to project the impacts of their proposals. These analyses are 
t~p1cally technically competent and methodologically defensible, but frequently · 
biased toward the positive impacts of development. The analysts are being paid 
by the developers and not by the community and emphasize the values that the 
developer seeks to maximize, such as the economic benefits of the project, 
rather than the impact of the project on the quality of community life. As a result, 
many development processes that could result in community improvement are 
halted as communities organize around an agenda of refusal. In other cases, 
developers are able to dominate the development process and force an ill 
conceived project on an uninvolved community. This paper will examine the case 
of a sports facility, housing and commercial development project development in 
New York City with the goal of understanding steps that could be taken to 
facilitate more constructive dialogue between developers and communities. In 
2005 and 2006 three major development projects with sports facilities at their 
core were proposed in New York City: (1) The West Side of Manhattan Olympic-
Jets Stadium; (2) The Nets arena and Atlantic Yard development in Brooklyn and 
(3) The construction of a new Yankee Stadium in the Bronx. We will analyze the 
Nets case in detail. · 
This paper provides background on New York City's land use development 
process requirements and then presents a case study of sports facility 
development processes in New York City. The paper: 
· • Discusses the issue of representation theory and linkage of the public to 
unelected leaders. 
• Summarizes the land use review process and opportunities for citizen 
participation. 
• · Details the level, intensity and direction of community involvement in the 
case. 
• Discusses additional processes that might encourage constructive 
community participation. 
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In an increasingly crowded and interdependent world, people have gotten more 
sensitive about land use development issues. The issue of environmental justice 
has reached the political agenda because rich people are better able to defend 
themselves against environmental insults than poor people. In the United States, 
local politics in many places has become the politics of land use and 
development. This paper will examine the issue in one city and raise issues that 
could be analyzed in other cities in the United States. 
Representation Theory and Community Based Political Demands about 
Development 
While sports facility development requires the leadership of elected leaders,. it 
tends to be dominated by unelected leaders such as New York City's Deputy 
Mayor for Economic Development, Dan Doctoroff. Citizens living near these 
proposed facilities rely on elected representatives and traditional .rou~es to . 
provide political input, but they also seek direct avenues of part1c1pat1on. This 
section of the paper analyzes the role of such participation in our system of 
representative governance here in the United States. 
There are two key concepts of a collaborative process: communication of · 
"system needs" (elite-to-mass communication) and articulation of i:iass ne.eds 
and wants (representation). Representation is a complex and mult1d1mens1onal 
phenomenon. Various scholars have seen fit to interpret !t in striki.n~ly different 
fashion. According to Charles A. Beard and John D. Lewis, the ong1n of 
representative government can be traced to Europe in the Middle Ages. Although 
the concept of representation was not "utterly foreign"1. to anci.~nt Greek and 
Roman politics, it was not an important concept in anc1~nt political .~hough!. The 
modern term is derived from the Latin representare, which means to bnng 
before one, to bring back, to exhibit, to show, to manifest, to display."2 The term 
was not used in the modern sense of one human being acting in the place of 
another, rather it was used to indicate the actual presence of an object once 
absent or "the embodiment of an abstraction in an object"3 (as, for example, a conce~t illustrated in a work of art). According to Beard and Lewis: ''No 
illustration of its (representation's) use in a political sense appears before the 
sixteenth century, at least in the record of the Oxford English dictionary."4 
The concept of representation, therefore, is relatively new, .dating.back less Iha~ 
five hundred years. Its origins can be found in the pragmatic requirements of elite 
1 Charles A. Beard & John D. Lewis, "Representative Government In Evolution," American 
Political Science Review, 26 (April 1832), p. 230. 
2 
Ibid. I C l'f · 3 Hannah F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkley and Los Ange. es, a 1 orrna: 
University of California Press, 1967), p. 3. . . . . . '" . 
4 Beard and Lewis, QQ. cit., p 225. Pitkin (Ibid.) appears to place. its first political use m t.~e 13 
and 14'" centuries. Fairlie appears to agree with Beard and Lewis. See John A. .Fairlie, The 





rule rather than due to any mass movement for popular voice in government. 
Beard arid Lewis note that representative government: 
... did not spring up because people suddenly decided to govern themselves, 
displayed the capacity, and set up parliaments. It was called into being by 
medieval monarchs who had established or maintained by the sword political 
power over wide territorial areas containing a large population ... The monarchs 
who first called representatives of communities or estates to grant money and 
give counsel were not thinking of democracy; they were concerned primarily with 
the conservation of the peace and the administration of lucrative justice, and the 
replenishment of their royal treasuries. Even the most despotic medieval 
monarch could not tax and exploit his subjects without limits.5 
Beard and Lewis document four phases of development of representative 
government in England. The first, described above, did not provide for 
representation of people, but of estates ("nobility, clergy, landed gentry, and 
burgesses of towns"). 6 These early legislatures met to ratify the king's taxes and 
did not actually legislate in the modern sense. 
During the second phase of development, the tax-approving assemblage 
gradually became a law-making body. The "estate representatives" eventually _ 
began to discuss common problems and grievances. When they c'ame to agree 
on a preferred solution to the problem at hand, these representatives would draft 
a petition and present it to the king. If the monarch approved the petition, it 
became law. The king could not casually dismiss these petitions, "since the 
parliament held the purse strings."7 The third phase culminated when the estate 
representatives achieved primacy over the monarch, thus forming the 
constitutional or limited monarchy. Finally, beginning around the time of the 
French Revolution, representative government began to take on its "mass" 
character. Beard and Lewis note that: "the economic estates that made 
themselves sovereign through representative institutions had not long enjoyed 
the fruits of their labors when rumblings were heard from below. "8 It was at this 
phase that the notion of popular sovereignty was introduced, stating that the 
people as a whole were the legitimate source of governmental power. The belief 
that each individual was entitled to take part in governmental decision making 
first began to gain currency during this era. Representation in this sense was . 
merely a practical compromise settled on because the size of the modern state 
precluded direct democracy. The notion of representation that was articulated 
during this fourth phase is quite similar to an intuitive understanding of the 
modern concept of representation. 
The connection between democracy and representation is one that contemporary 
scholars find quite natural. There are, however, non-democratic aspects to the 
5 Beard and Lewis, QR. cit, pp. 230-231. 6 -
7 
Ibid., p. 231. 
8 
Ibid , p. 232. 
Ibid., p. 233_ 
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historic and modern concepts of representation. In fact, as a move away from 
direct democracy, representation can be seen as intrinsically antidemocratic. 
Rousseau, for example, saw representation as impossible and maintai~ed that 
the general will (or public interest) could only be articulat~d via mass direct 
democracy.9 Despite numerous advocates, the democratic principles of the 
French Revolution have never been entirely accepted. As noted earlier, however, 
there are a variety of definitions of the concept of representation; we now turn to 
an examination of them. 
Hannah Pitkin has observed that representation " ... is a highly complex concept 
that has not changed much since the seventeenth century." Pitkin goes on to. 
offer the following definition: " ... representation means, as the words e_tymolog1cal 
origins indicate, representation, making present again ... Representation, _taken 
generally, means the making present in some sense of something which 1s 
nevertheless not present literally, or in fact."10 
Over sixty-five years ago (1940) John A. Fairlie set forth a similar, but somewhat 
more elaborate definition of representation: "Etymologically, the literal meaning of 
represent is to "present again," and from this it has come to mean to app~ar in 
place of another. In this secondary sense, a representative has been defined as 
an agent, deputy, or substitute, who supplies the place of another or others."11 
Fairlie indicates the broad range of phenomena subsumed under the rubric of 
representation. A representative may be selected b~ an actor t_o act in his (her) 
place with limited authority to act, or with the authority to act with some measure 
of discretion-without clear instructions. · 
Representation is not simply a political concept; it is utilized in a_rt, law, theater, 
education, language, and other. contexts. These other uses are_ important,_ but for 
this analysis its meaning as a political concept 1s c~1!1cal. Its political meaning 
should always imply some sort of power relat1onsh1p bet~e~n the rep~ese_nted 
and the representative. The legitimacy of the representatives powe: 1~ this 
relationship as we understand it today derives from the reP_rese~tatwe s .. 
accountability to those being represented, The power relat1onsh1p ma_y be expl1c1t 
or implicit, mutual, exclusive, or possibly a variable subject to fluctuat1on over 
time. 
To Thomas Hobbes, representation is the mechanism by which individuals . . 
escape the ungoverned state of nature, that theoretical hell on earth "."'here l_1fe is 
nasty short and brutish. As a result of the social contract, each 1nd1v1dual gives 
up hi~ (her) 'right of self-government to a sove~eig_n _power in order to escape the 
state of nature. This sovereign represents the 1nd1v1dual 1n the sense !_hat thi; 
individual accepts the decisions of the sovereign as if they are the 1nd1v1dual s 
9 J. J_ Rousseau, "The Social Contract" (in Hannah Pitkin (Ed.) Representation, (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1969). 
10 Ibid., p. 8. Emphasis in the original. 





own decisions, as binding decisions. According to Pitkin: 'The content of the 
social contract by which men found the state is precisely the establishment of a 
re~res.entative-a sov~reign who will make the multitude into a single body by 
ruling 1t and representing its authority."12 
The. Hobbesian concept ?f representation is the authorization of a sovereign to 
act 1n place of each 1nd1v1dual member of society. Representation, in this view "is 
authority, the right to make commitments and incur consequences for another:..13 
The representative acts and the represented is bound by these decisions and is 
responsible for their consequences as if they themselves had been the actor. 
In the contemporary view, the representative is given the authority to act in place 
of the represented. There is an aspect of the modern sense of representation in 
which the decision maker (or representative) is legitimately permitted discretion 
when making decisions. The representative is permitted to act without 
ins.tr~ctions when he (she) is unsure of his (her) constituents' opinion, (or no. 
opinions exist), and in certain situations is accorded legitimate authority to act 
contrary to the opinions of his (her) constituents on matters of conscience. The 
modern view maintains, however, that constituents have the right to hold the 
representative accountable for his (her) actions and revoke the grant of authority 
entrusted to the representative while the Hobbesian view permits ho such 
revocation of authority. 
This view of representation totally distributes decision-making power to the 
representative. The acts of the representative or sovereign are not subject to 
challenge, for to challenge the sovereign is to risk ending civil government and 
re-entering the barbaric state of nature. The representative decides and the 
represented bear the consequences of the decision. The representative has 
freedom to act and is responsible for protecting the security of the state. The 
citizens are expected to obey the edicts of the decision maker/representative, 
and live with the consequences of those decisions. The represented do not have 
any leverage over the representative, and the balance of power is 
overwhelmingly skewed toward the representative. 
To Hobbes, representation is seen as authorization, the formal arrangements 
that precede and initiate the activities of representation. 14 A view of 
representation that is the complete opposite of authorization is presented by 
scholars Pitkin has termed "accountability theorists." This view defines 
representation as the formal arrangements that follow and potentially terminate 
representative activity, as "accountability," the holding to account of the 
representative for his actions."15 Accountability is not simply intended as a means 
12 
Hannah Pitkin, "The Concept of Representation" (in Pitkin (Ed.) Representation, New York: 
Atherton Press, 1969) p. 8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Pitkin, 1967. QQ. cit., p. 11. 
15 Ibid. 
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of punishing representatives for taking wrong positions, but as a stimulus for 
. eliciting from representatives behavior that is responsive to the needs of the 
represented. 
The accountability view of representation leaves a measure of power in the 
hands of the represented. According to this view, at some point a day of 
reckoning comes to pass, and the nonresponsive representative can be removed 
from office. Hence, the power relationship can be described as follows: in the 
short run, the representative is in the .dominant position, but due to their ultimate 
veto, the represented have the last word and in the long run hold greater power. 
Clearly, the represented hold greater power in this view of representation than. in 
the authorization view. Nonetheless, the public's leverage is periodic and latent 
rather than continuous and present. This concept does not specify that the 
representative's role is continuous responsiveness to the represented, although 
logically, it involves some attention and concern for responsiveness. 
During the American Revolution, John Adams argued that a representative . 
legislature "should be an exact portrait, in miniature of the people at large, as 1t 
should think, feel, reason and act like them." According to Adams, in "a 
representative assembly ... the perfection of the portrait consists in its likeness."16 
Representatives should be as similar as possible to the represented. In attitude 
and social origin, representatives should mirror the public. Much of the literature 
in "representative" bureaucracy appears based on this conception of . 
representation. Norton Long argued that the unelected federal bureaucracy was 
more "representative" than elected legislators because the social and economic 
status (SES) level of the bureaucracywas closer to the national average than 
that of elected officials. 17 In the 1970's, Kennet J. Meir utilized both attitudinal 
and SES measures to compare bureaucracy with the broad public. In so doing, 
Meir accepted the view of representation as description, but argued for more 
complete measurement (both demographic and attitudinal) prior to conducting 
. 18 governmentcmass comparisons. 
Representation is thus simply reproducing the views of the public and 
incorporating these views into the decision making process. Similarly, a.dv.ocates 
of proportional representation schemes are actually advocates of descriptive 
representation. Proportional representation is simply a form of sampling. 
The aspect of representation that involves providing information about the views 
and attitudes of the represented can also be categorized as descriptive 
representation. In addition, .those theorists who see representative government 
16 Adams, quoted in Pitkin, Ibid., pp. 60-61. . . . . . 
17 Norton Long, "Bureaucracy and constitutionalism" American Political Science Review, 46 
!September 1952), pp. 808-818. . . . ,, . . . 
ls Kenneth J. Meir, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empmcal Analys.1s, ~mencan Pol1t1cal 
Science Review, 64 (June 1975), pp. 526-542. Also see V. Subramanian, Representative 
Bureaucracy: A Reassessment" (American Political Science Review, 61, D.ecember 1967), pp. 
1010-1019. 
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as a practical substitute for direct democracy are arguing for a form of descriptive 
representation. If the representative body is a surrogate for the population as a 
whole, it follows that it should be as nearly like the population as possible. 
Descriptive representation does not require or imply public control of the activities 
of representatives. The represented have no leverage over the representatives. 
All that is required is that representatives have attitudes and attributes that are 
similar to those of the public. The type of elite-mass linkage mechanism resulting 
from descriptive representation would be what Norman Luttbeg has termed "non-
coercive" linkage. No one forces the representative to represent the public; the 
representative does it "naturally." 
Symbolic representation is perhaps one of the more abstract and difficult-to-
grasp aspects of representation. While descriptive representation defines 
representation as a reasonable facsimile, or a mirror image, symbolic 
representation need not involve a representational likeness. Examples of 
representative symbols include a nation's flag or its head of state (representing 
the nation's unity), a corporate logo (representing the image of the company) and 
the "ban the bomb" or peace symbol (representing pacifism). 
In Pitkin's view, representation ought to be seen as the activity of 
representatives. 19 In the final analysis, representation is the result of human 
activities or behavior. There are three general modes of representative behavior: 
(1) The representative as an independent actor, or "trustee" cif the public welfare; 
(2) the representative as an instructed actor, a delegate, strictly following the 
dictates of the represented population; and (3) the representative as a 
responsive actor, balancing system needs with the preferences of the 
population-a role we have termed responsive stewardship. It is important to 
note that both elected and unelected decision makers. can be representatives. 
Their style of decision making will determine whether they are in fact 
representatives, and will indicate their representational type. · 
Representation As Responsive Stewardship: A Composite Definition of 
Representation 
Having presented a number of aspects of the meaning of representation, we will 
attempt to integrate the useful elements of each partial definition of 
representation into an overarching definition of representation. 
Each separate meaning of representation taps a key component of the 
overarching definition being set forth: 
• Representation as authority. The representative must be capable of acting with 
authority and must be part of a representative system that actually governs. 
19 Pitkin, 1967, QQ. cit., p. 112. 
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Establishing an elaborate representational system to connect citizens to a 
powerless institution is a meaningless charade. 
• Representation as accountability. The represented should have a formal 
mechanism for removing unresponsive representatives. If responsiveness is to 
be assured, such a device should be available. Mechanisms should be 
established that require representatives to periodically submit themselves to the 
judgment of the represented. This presents problems for adminis.trative 
accountability and even more problems for contractor accountability. 
• Representation as description. In order to facilitate responsiveness, the 
representatives must share, or the representative system should at least 
promote, understanding of the attitudes and attributes of the represented. 
• Representation as symbolism. A sehse of citizen .efficacy is a lik~ly 
precondition for a responsive political system. The literature of poll~1cal 
participation indicates that politically efficacious citizens are more likely to .. 
participate than citizens who believe they cannot affect governmental dec1s1ons. 
Efficacy is related to the citizenry's feeling that they own their governme~t ~nd 
that they belong to, or are citizens of; a nation. Hence, there may be a s1gn1f1cant 
connection between symbolic representation and political responsiveness. 
• Representation as the activity of representatives. Representation is the result 
of human behavior. As noted earlier, the "mandate vs. independence" 
controversy illustrates two extreme behavior patterns open to the representative: 
To act as a mandated delegate, only act following the receipt of strict instructions 
from the represented, and to act as an independent tru.stee, act according .to the 
representative's personal notion of public interest. A third pat~ern of.b.ehav1or, 
lying somewhere between these two extremes is representative act1v1ty that 
pursues responsive stewardship. . . . 
• The Activity of Responsive Stewardship. Responsive ste~ardsh1p 1~ ~ . 
representative role that considers each aspect of representation as leg1t1mate in 
varying degrees, and that attempts to balance the various elements in .order to 
establish a meaningful link between citizens and government. This notion of 
responsive stewardship is strongly influen~e~ ~y the incisi~e a~alyses of Hannah 
Pitkin. Although representation is a set of 1nd1v1dual behaviors, 1t 1s only given 
political meaning when those individual acts are part of'. and structured by, a 
representative system. We are concerned, th.erefore, with a system of . 
representation, a style of governance that strives to respond to the "."1shes of its 
citizens while simultaneously providing effective governance. Effective 
governance is that condition that exists when govern~~nt is able to pro~ide for 
the long-term and short-term welfare of the mass of c1t1zens. A responsive 
political system is one that gives citizens what they want. 
Following Pitkin, we maintain that a representa'.ive syste~ is not ~i~ply a system 
that provides citizens with the policies they desire. The .v1el/>Js of c!!izens must be 
represented to something. That something is a.n authoritative dec1s1on .n:iaking . 
process. Representation divorced from power 1s meaningless. Responsiveness is 
an aspect of representation; it is not, however, the entire concept. 
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The question then arises: What standards can be utilized to judge the 
responsiveness of the representative system and thereby judge a key factor 
contributing to the representativeness of that system? Exhibit 1 illustrates the 
broad outline of a set of criteria for judging the responsiveness of the 
representative system. 
The two circles in Exhibit 1 are meant to symbolize two concepts: citizen wishes, 
and system needs. The Exhibit is divided into four category zones. In Zone 4 are 
those needs toward which citizens have formed no clear attitudes. 
Exhibit 1 







S.yste1n .H~e 4s 
Citizen wishes, then, are divided into three categories: (1) Those wishes that are 
detrimental to the needs of the social, ecological, political and/or economic 
system (Zone 1); (2) Those wishes in harmony with system-maintenance 
requirements (Zone 2); and (3) Those wishes irrelevant to relatively 
inconsequential vis-a-vis system needs (Zone 3). An effective system of 
governance will naturally attempt to maximize responsiveness to Zone 2 issues. 
This is simply a case of enlightened self-interest. 
Wishes fulfilled in Zone 2 may provide little indication of the responsiveness of 
the representative system. These system needs and citizen wishes ought to be 
fulfilled in the interest of stewardship. It is unfair to judge the responsiveness of 
the representative system on issues in Zone 1, because wishes of this type 
conflict with the stewardship function of the representative system and should not 
be fulfilled. The least biased test of responsiveness is to judge the representative 
system's capability on matters where citizen preferences are relatively irrelevant 
to system needs. It should be expected that, at times, it will be difficult to assess 
whether a public's wish is detrimental to life-support requirements. Analysis will 
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need to explore the general thrust of a particular issue and try to keep in mind the 
limitations inherent in our categorization scheme. Despite these difficulties, such 
a categorization of citizen wishes i.s essential if responsiveness is to be 
meaningfully evaluated. An example of a wish that is detrimental to long-term 
systems maintenance would be the desire Americans appear to have for large 
gas-guzzling automobiles. Such a wish need not be responded to by a . 
representative government because it endangers ecosystem and economic 
system maintenance. An example of a wish that may be irrelevant to system. 
survival might be citizen life-style preferences (e.g. collective vs. 1nd1v1dual, 
extended family vs. nuclear family, urban vs. rural living, etc.). Those preferences 
affect the character of society, but need not affect its survival. 
Normally, when government responds to the citizenry, it is reacting to the 
exercise or fear of the exercise of citizen power. For representative government, 
responsiveness and the authority to assure stewardship are egually critic~!, and 
achieving the balance that brings about the maximum responsiveness while 
simultaneously assuring stewardship is the main difficulty encountered when 
attempting to maintain a healthy representative system. The balance necessary 
is essentially a balance of power between the elite and the masses, hence our 
earlier concern with the power relationship lurking beneath the surface 1n each 
definition of representation. It is possible that the representative system may be 
overly responsive or overly rigid. System maintenance involves system change, 
but there is always the danger that a society's elite will confuse system . 
maintenance with system stagnation. Due to the ever-present tendency of elites 
to slip into system threatening conservatism, the public will often need power to 
force government to respond to their demands.20 Yet government must somehow 
maintain enough power to respond to those demands effectively. Power then 1s a 
necessary condition of responsiveness; citizen power to make demands, and 
government power to respond to those demands. 
In addition, the representative system must include adequate mech~nisms of 
demand articulation. Such mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions of political responsiveness. For purposes of this analysi~, the 
mechanisms of demand articulation can be seen as the rough equivalent of the 
linkage mechanisms identified in the work of Norman Luttbeg. 21 Ac~ording to 
Luttbeg: "Any means by which political leaders ~ct 1n accordance wit~. \~e wants, . 
needs and demands of the public in policy-making 1s political linkage . Luttbeg 
notes that"this definition avoids the limiting idea that linkage is either just. · 
communication between the representative and the represented or compliance 
by representatives to public opinion forced on them by public participation".23 
20 This is a situation where an elite is so resistant to change that the social system itself cannot be 
maintained. . . 
21 See Norman Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (Revised Ed1t1on, Homewood, 
Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1974). 




Luttbeg sees two basic modes of citizen demand articulation: passive and active. 
Passive demand articulation generally falls under Luttbeg's category of "non-
coercive linkage". Active demand articulation is usually a coercive-style linkage, 
in Luttbeg's parlance. Luttbeg focuses on the issue of citizen leverage vis-a-vis 
the representative, sharing our concern for this critical power relationship. In 
essence, there are two ways that governments receive messages pertaining to 
citizen demands. Government can pick up the messages painlessly either 
because representative decision makers share the beliefs of the public (Luttbeg's 
"sharing" model}, or because they believe they ought to reflect the beliefs of the 
public (Luttbeg's "role playing" model). The second way government receives 
. messages is somewhat more "painful". Citizens force government to listen to 
their views. 
Luttbeg identifies three of these "coercive" models of political linkage. They are 
as follows: 
• The Rational Activist Model, 
• · The Political Parties Model, and 
• The Pressure Groups Model. . 
Citizen~government linkage is a prerequisite of responsiveness,' which in turn is a 
central component of the concept ofrepreseritation. Linkage mechanisms range 
from coercive to noncoercive. Each type of mechanism is helpful if representation 
is to occur, but a key requirement for a responsive political system is the 
presence of on-going and organized coercive mechanisms that articulate mass 
demands. There are two polar types of organization imaginable: (1) Mass-based 
political parties, and (2) interest-based voluntary organizations (interest groups). 
Group and pluralist theorists have claimed that most significant interests in 
society are represented in decision making by organized interest groups. 
However, a second stream of theorists has disputed the claim that mass 
representation can be achieved through interest groups.24 In The Semi-
Sovereign People, E. E. Schattschneider notes that "there is a great wealth of 
data supporting the proposition that participation in private associations exhibits a 
class bias ... The data raise a serious question about the validity of the 
proposition that special interest groups are a universal form of political 
organizations reflecting all interests".25 Schattschneider then analyzes and 
compares the party and group pressure models of political linkage. According to 
Schattschneider, "The basic issue between the two patterns of organization is 
one of size and scope of conflict; pressure groups are small sc.ale organizations 
24 See E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 
1960), Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of 
Agenda Building (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1972) and Peter Bachrach 
and Morton Baratz, "Decision and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework" American Political 
Science Review, 57 (September 1963), pp. 632-42. 
Schattschneider, lbdi., p. 34. 
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while political parties are very large scale organizations. One need not be 
surprised, therefore, that the partisans of large scale and small scale 
organizations differ passionately, because the outcome of the political game 
depends on the scale on which it is played."26 . 
Pressure politics is oriented toward achieving the aims of special interests. Party 
politics, on the other hand, is oriented toward securing the common interest. Both 
have specific biases in the approach to resolving conflict. Pressure politics 
attempts to privatize conflict and reduce the scope of its contagion. To 
Schattschneider, conflict is the essence of politics. In The Semi-Sovereign 
People he states that: " ... the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of 
its contagion."27 A look at political literature shows that there has indeed been a 
long-standing struggle between conflicting tendencies toward privatization and 
·socialization of conflict. 28 (and} Control of the scale of conflict has always been a 
· prime instrument of political strategy.29 The role ofcornmunity based interest 
groups in this political process in the United States is one that requires additional 
study. Whatever the composition of these groups, they make an effort to · 
represent the int~rests of less powerful people living within specific 
neighborhoods. 
A major arena of conflict in politics is the political_ agenda-setting proc~ss. 30 
Demand articulation is a central component of this process. The two different 
modes of coercive organized linkage exhibits strikingly differenttendencies 
regarding which (or whose) demands are articulated. The pressure ~ystem of 
organized interest groups pursuing special interests is a demand art~culat1on 
system heavily skewed toward the "have" elements of American society. As 
Schattschneider proclaimed in his now famous statement, "The flaw in the 
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class 
accent. Probably about 90% of the people can't get in the pressure system."31 
The question today, with community based interest groups and low cost . . 
communication via the internet, is: Could Schattscheneider's formulation require 
revision? We do not address that here, and leave it to future research. · 
The representative system's ability to respond to the wishes of the public can be 
seriously compromised by reliance on any exclusionary method of demand 
articulation. For this reason, the status of a society's party politics, or more · 
generally, the status of mass based groups organized to pursue the common 
interest is a key determinant of a political system's responsiveness. In today's 
political process the role of money in political campaigns may very well have 
compromised the ability of electoral politics to be truly representative. 
26 Ibid., p. 20. 
27 Ibid., p. 2. 
28 Ibid., p. 7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See Cobb & Elder, Q2. cit. 
31 Schattschneider, QQ. cit., p. 35. 
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The second aspect of the multidimensional conception of representation is 
stewardship. Stewardship, or the survival of society, is the central purpose of 
government. Although scholars concerned with effective decision making in 
government have pointed out the dangers of too much citizen voice in 
governance, students of representation have paid less attention to the need for 
. effective governance as prerequisite for meaningful representation. 
We take the perspective that responsiveness is only one aspect of 
representational activity, and that a second aspect is the ability of representative 
policy makers to deliver policy outputs and outcomes responsive to public 
demands. When analyzing a representative system, it is important to first identify 
the authoritative decision makers in a political system and then assess the 
responsiveness of these decision makers to the wishes of the public. Much of the 
study of representation has focused on the responsiveness of legislatures. Yet 
important policy decisions are made every day in the executive branch, 
particularly its unelected bureaucratic component. In the case of local level 
development decisions, many of the key decisions in New York City are made by 
unelected leaders. Linkage to "what" is a central and often unexamined question 
in the literature of representation. Decision making studies and representation 
studies emerge from different streams of literature and the two phenomena are 
studied simultaneously only rarely. In order to understand the politics of land use 
development in New York, it is necessary to view it within the framework 
provided by representation theory. 
With this broad conceptual view of representation in place, we are ready to 
discuss the case of local level land development in New York City. 
Community Politics in New York City 
As New York City has been completely developed, and in some neighborhoods 
redeveloped, more than once, the politics of land use has become increasingly 
· contentious. While institutions such as Columbia University, and the sports 
franchise detailed in this paper are attempting large-scale developments in New 
York City, even smaller scale projects are facing routine and increased 
opposition by interest groups and local community organizations. 
The era of development as self-justifying is long gone, even in parts of the United 
States that are not as built up as New York City. Housing developers are well 
aware of the importance of politics on the land use development process. 
This anti-development fervor is further reinforced by the geographic emphasis of 
representation in the United States. At-large voting legislators are seen as a 
violation of the one-person, one vote ruling by the United States Supreme Court. 
When this is added to single member districts and winner-take-all elections, the 
need for a high level of responsiveness to local interests is reinforced by the 
political structure. A developer may have financial resources that can be helpful 








community opposition, the local elected leader will have little choice but to side 
with anti-development forces. This sometimes puts the local leader at odds with 
city-wide or state-wide elected officials. Additionally, we note a nationwide trend 
to design land use development processes that attempt to prevent development. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's June, 2005 decision in allowing the City of New 
London, Connecticut to use the power of eminent domain to take private homes 
for an economic development project has caused a nation-wide backlash against 
large-scale projects such as stadiums. According to NY Times reporter John M. 
Broder: 
In a rare display of unanimity that cuts across partisan and geographic lines, 
lawmakers in virtually every statehouse across the country are advancing bills 
and constitutional amendments to limit use of the government's power of eminent 
domain to seize private property for economic development purposes ... 
The reaction from the states was swift and heated. Within weeks of the court's 
decision, Texas, Alabama and Delaware passed bills by overwhelming bipartisan 
margins limiting the right of local governments to seize property and turn it over 
to private developers. Since then, lawmakers in three dozen other states have 
proposed similar restrictions and more are on the way, according to experts who 
track the issue. 32 · 
This anti-development reaction indicates that the sanctity of private property is a 
stronger political force than those promoting local economic land use . 
development. We see evidence of this in New York's three. recen~ ~tad1um. . 
controversies, and a clear sense that the city's representative political 1nst1tut1ons 
are struggling to dealwith these strongly held but conflicting values. 
Normal Land Use Development in New York City: The Uniform Land Use 
Review Procedure (ULURP) 
Exhibit 2 provides a summary of the steps involved in typical land use 
development projects in New York City. The. "ULURP" process provides 
extensive opportunities for participation in project review by elected leader~, the 
general public, and interest groups. The ULURP process beg1_ns w1~h a review by 
the city's Department of City Planning and then requires consideration by the 
local Community Board. New York City is divided into 59 Community Board 
Districts. Each Board includes up to 50 members appointed by the Borough 
President with half of those nominated by the City Council Members who 
represent
0
the community district. The Community Board must hold .a public. 
hearing on the project and then submit a recommendation to_ the City Pla_nning 
Commission which must also hold a hearing and then submit their dec1s1on to 
. ' 
32 Broder, "States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes", NY Times, February 
21,2006 
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the City Council. The Council and the Mayor then review the project. The City 
Council has the option of also holding a public hearing. This process is time 
consuming, but provides a set of predictable and transparent steps for project 
review. A number of state agencies have the authority to develop land without 
being subject to the ULURP process. · 
A Bas.ketball Arena Grows in Brooklyn 
In mid-2003, Forest City Ratner Inc. (led by real estate developer Bruce Ratner) 
announced its plan to buy and then move the New Jersey Nets basketball 
franchise to Brooklyn, vowing to give the borough its first major professional 
sports team since the Brooklyn Dodgers left for Los Angeles after the 1957 
baseball season. 
The Ratner Plan envisions an extensive 22-acre development, which would 
include the nation's most expensive NBA arena, 17 buildings from 19 to 58 
stories tall, and nine million square feet of new office and residential space .. 
Proponents say the Ratner Plan will bring back a long-lost sports pride to 
Brooklyn and will also be an economic boon for the borough by injecting jobs and 
cash inflow into Brooklyn's economy. Opponents say Forest City Ratner's real 
motive is not basketball and economic development but the opportunity to build a 
massive and lucrative housing development while circumventing the city's 
standard land-use review process. Opponents also claim that the social costs of 
the Ratner project (i.e. increased traffic, loss of green-space and the 
disproportional size of the project) far outweigh the economic benefits. 
The opposition to the Forest City Ratner development is made up of community 
organizations and a few non-profit public advocacy groups located and operating 
in and around the Brooklyn area in which the project is to be constructed. 
While some of these organizations fit into the more extreme and thus highly· 
intractable anti-development category, some are more moderate. The "not in my 
back-yard" response to urban development initiatives is normal and particularly 
pronounced in New York City. One organization that was formed to fight the Nets 
development was the organization "Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn." 
The organization sued Forest Ratner last year to prevent the company from 
tearing down a stretch of five Brooklyn buildings that they believe are too 
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Exhibit 2 : Uniform Land Use Review 
Procedure33 
STEP I - Department of City Planning (no specific time 
limit) 
• Receives application and related documents 
• Department of City Planning is responsible to 
forward the application and documents within 5 days 
to: a) Community Board b) Borough President c) 
City Coun_cil 
• Certifies the application as complete 
STEP II - Community Board (60 Days, Total 60 Days) 
• Notifies Public 
• Holds Public Hearing 
• Submits recommendation to City Planning 
Commission and Borough President/Borough Board 
• Can waive rights on franchise RFP's and l6ases 
STEP III - Borough President (and) Borough Board (30 
Days, Total 90 Days). 
• Borough President submits recommendation to the 
City Planning Commission or waives right to do so 
• Borough Board (if project affects more than I 
Community Board) may hold a public hearing and 
submit recommendation to the City Planning 
Cotnmission or waive their right to do so 
STEP IV - City Planning Commission (60 Days, Total 150 
Days) 
• Holds public hearing 
• Approves, modifies or disapproves application 
• Files approvals and approvals with modifications 
with the City Council 
· • Disapprovals are final, except for zoning map 
·changes, special permits, and urban renewal plans 
CITY COUNCIL & MAYORAL REVIEW (Charter 
Section 197-d) 
Powers of the City Council (50 Days): 
I) Can review application, hold a public hearing, and 
vote to approve, approve with modification, or 
disapprove 
2) Refers any proposed modifications to City Planning 
Commission for an additional 15 day review 
3) If Council does not act (or does not assume 
jurisdiction on items it must elect to review), City 
Pla1U1ing Commission decision is final 
Powers of the Mayor (5 Days): 
1) Reviews application 
2) May veto Council action 
3) If Council does not act (or does not assume 
jurisdiction on items it must elect to review), may 
veto City Planning Commission decision 
4) City Council (10 Days, final opportunity to affect 
the procedure) 
l. May override Mayor's veto by 2/3 vote 
33 New York City Department of City Planning, "The 
Uniform Land Use Review Procedure" 
http://www. nyc. gov /html/dcp/pdf/lu proc/lur. pdf 
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If City Planning Commission APPROVES Application: 
Automatic Review by City Council 
Action requires n1ajority vote by City Council, then goes 
to the Mayor 
l. Zoning map changes 
2. Zoning text changes (non ULURP) 
3. Housing and urban renewal plans 
4. Disposition of residential buildings (except to non-
profit companies for low-income housing) 
• "TRIPLE NO" -Auto111atic Review by Council 
Action requires majority vote by City Council, then 
goes to the Mayor 
I. City Board recommended disapproval (NO # l) 
2. Borough President recommended disapproval (NO 
#2) 
3. City Planning Commission approved or approved 
with 'modification 
4. Borough President files objection with Council and 
City Planning Commission within 5 days of receipt 
ofCPC's approval (NO #3) 
• City Council may Elect to Review: 
Must assu1ne jurisdiction within 20 days. Action 
requires majority vote 
1. City Map Changes 
2. Map df subdivisions or plattings 
3. City Planning Commission special permits 
4. . Revocable consents, franchise RFP's) and major 
concessions 
5. Non-City public improvements 
6. Landfills 
7. Disposition of con1mercial or vacant prope1ty 
8. Disposition of residential buildings to nonprofit 
companies for low income housing 
9. Acquisition ofreal property 
10. Site selection 
If City Planning Commission DISAPPROVES 
Application, All Items are DEFEATED Except: 
Action requires 213 vote. Action is FINAL (50 Days 
*does not include I 5 day review for proposed 
modifications) 
I. SPECIAL PERMITS, if Mayor certifies as necessary 
2. ZONING MAP and TEXT CHANGES, if Mayor 
certifies as necessary 
Action requires-% vote. Action .is FINAL. Law and 
timetable to be revised 
I. URBAN RENEW AL PLANS, Per State Law 
valuable in historical significance to tear down. In the suit, the organization 
contended that there had been no independent engineering review to confirm 
Forest City Ratner's analysis that the buildings present an imminent safety 
hazard. The Empire State Development Corp., which is in charge of reviewing 
the $3.5 billion Atlantic Yards proposal that includes the arena, was named in the 
suit along with Forest City Ratner. The suit is still pending. 
A number of elected officials oppose the project. Councilwoman Letticia James 
has been particularly vociferous in her opposition to the project. Other local 
elected officials opposed the project as well. The project, as of September 16, 
. 2005, included 7,300 residential units (4,500 rental apartments, half "affordable," 
plus 2800 market-rate condos). Critics argued that some of the promises made 
by the project's developers have been broken. For instance, the six acres of 
landscaped "public" space will continue to be owned by the developer. A park on 
the arena's roof was originally promised to be public, but in plans disseminated in 
the fall 2005, it was termed a private facility. In early 2005, supporters of the 
project argued that 50% of the 4,500 apartments would be low-income. In late 
2005, the number of apartments was raised to 7,300, and the definition of 
"moderate income" was set at $109,000 per year. The average income in 
Brooklyn is $35,000, and 900 apartments will be available for residents who 
make less than that. Of those 900, many will not be on the main Atlanitc Yards 
site, thus segregating the new.residents by income. City Councilmember Charles 
Barron has asserted that the project will be "instant gentrification." 
While opposition was intense, the developer worked with local community 
organizations and clergy and promised local employment and a large number of 
subsidized housing units. This enabled them to generate substantial elite and 
community support. The project's key supporters included: 
• Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
• Governor George Pataki 
• Rev. Al Sharpton 
• ACORN - The Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now, the advocacy group that has fought previous 
Forest City projects, which this time struck a deal to include a 
significant amount of moderate- and low-cost housing in the . 
project. 
• The Downtown Brooklyn Neighborhood Alliance, founded by 
Rev. Herbert Daughtry, pastor of the House of the Lord 
Churches on Atlantic Avenue. 
• Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD). 
which critics say was literally founded by Forest Ratner to 
cheerlead for the project. The group formed just days after the 
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project was approved, and subsequently received a $100,000 
donation from Forest Ratner. 
• New York State Association of Minority Contractors 
• Working Families Party 
However, as mentioned above, in late 2005 some of his support was threatened 
when a revised project plan reduced the amount of residential development in 
the plan and replaced it with increased commercial space. 
It is clear that the developer understood the political nature of the process of 
building a project in New York City. He worked hard to develop alliances and 
adapt the project plan to meet community needs. To some degree this process 
was undermined by the changing economics of the project, which resulted in 
changes in the mix of commercial and residential property. 
Another factor that resulted in increased opposition to the project was the effort 
to use New York State authority to avoid the city's regular land use review 
process. According to project opponent Tom Angotti: 
The Atlantic Yards project was born two years ago when Forest City 
Ratner, one of the nation's largest developers with a virtual monopoly on 
downtown expansion, proposed what now appears to be the largest-ever 
project in the borough. The latest version of its project includes a 
professional basketball arena, 7,300 units of housing, and over 600,000 
square feet of office space. The developer then got Governor George 
Pataki, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and Brooklyn Borough President Marty 
Markowitz to voice full public support for the proposal. Then the governor 
unleashed the State of New York's Empire State Development 
Corporation, which he controls, to place at the developer's disposition the 
government's powers of eminent domain so that privately-owned land on 
the site could be assembled. 
With the Empire State Development Corporation at the head of the pack, 
Forest City Ratner could also avoid going through the city's Uniform Land 
Use Review Process (nicknamed, ULURP), which would force it to face 
votes by the local community boards, borough president, City Planning 
Commission, and City Council. The developer needed to get the right to 
build over the rail yards owned by the Metropolitan Transit Authority, but 
since this is a state-run agency controlled by the governor, a hastily-
planned Request for Proposals was put together so the developer could 
be guaranteed the rail yards. And $200 million in public subsidies were 
thrown in to sweeten the deal. 34 
34 Tom Agnotti, "Atlantic Yards: Through the Looking Glass", Gotham Gazette, November 15, 
2005 
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According to Agnotti, public opposition began to mobilize when the Empire State 
Development Corporation began its environmental impact assessment of the 
project. While the design of world elass architect Frank Gehry was striking, even 
project cheerleader Brooklyn Borough President Markowitz came to believe that 
the project was too big. While the project is still very much alive, it is clear that 
the proposal will be modified before it is accepted. As Agnotti notes: 
On October 18, over 800 people packed an auditorium in downtown 
Brooklyn to tell the Empire State Development Corporation about all the 
potential impacts that the developer's plan could have -- many more than 
the agency had proposed to study. This hearing was a cruciaLturning point 
for two reasons. First, it tarnished the image of inevitability and consensus 
that the developer had cultivated around the project. .. Secondly, it pointed 
out the need for careful, detailed planning for development of the Atlantic 
Yards site so that it would knit that development into the fabric of Fort 
Greene, Prospect Heights, Park Slope, Clinton Hill and other 
neighborhoods. 35 
At this writing, the planning process is well underway, and the final result is 
uncertain. What is not in doubt is that the representative institutions and 
stakeholders of local government-adhoc interest groups, economic interests 
and elected leaders-are now fully engaged in a visible and contentious public 
debate. 
The Brooklyn Nets, Atlantic Yards and Representative Democracy in 
Brooklyn 
The issue of land use and development has become increasingly contentious 
throughout the United States. Development was once seen as self-justifying. 
Today it is the subject of an intense effort by our political process to respond to a 
public that is increasingly opposed to changes in neighborhoods. The housing 
industry has grown and become more corporate and professional, in part to deal 
with the increasingly complex regulatory environment and political opposition to 
housing. The complexity of development has driven small local developers out of 
business in favor of larger developers with the capacity to deal with. local rules 
and politics. In a New York Times Magazine article in 2005, Jon Gertner 
interviewed housing developer Bob Toll of Toll Brothers, one of the nation's 
largest housing developers. Toll noted that NIMBY was now simply part of the 
cost of doing business: 
. Toll Brothers is a creature of this revolution. "We intended always to 
expand out of the Philadelphia suburbs and into New Jersey and into New 
York and Connecticut and Rhode Island and Massachusetts," Toll said. 
He never imagined, however, that he would be able to expand nationwide 
35 Agnotii: Ibid. 
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as quickly as he has. In his early days, he told me, if he wanted to build a 
few hundred homes in Pennsylvania, he could get a parcel of land through 
the approval process in a year or two. Now it's up to five years. He 
estimates that New York, California and Massachusetts take a similar 
amount of time. Even Florida and Virginia -- traditionally easy places to 
build -- can require a year or two. "This business was made for us to a 
large extent by Nimby politics," Toll said, referring to Not in My Backyard 
objections. "I don't denigrate Nimby, by the way. I just deal with it. It is. It's 
human nature. You don't want to see anything built behind where you live. 
His experience with Nimby opposition, Toll added, leads him to believe 
that the political resistance to land development around the country will 
get more intense in the coming years.36 
This drive for more controlled development must be expressed in the face of the 
economic poweNif.developers. In the case of the Atlantic Yard and Nets Arena 
project in Brooklyn, we see a powerful and politically connected developer lining 
up the Mayor, Governor and Borough President as well as community based 
interest groups such as ACORN and political leaders such as Al Sharpton. A 
number of representative issues are raised by this development case: 
• What is "responsive stewardship" in this case? The economic status-quo 
is far from perfect, and the jobs created by economic development can lift 
people out of poverty. Descriptive representation of those living in close 
proximity to the site might call for anti-development policy, but would the 
community's long term economic health be impaired by an anti-
development reputation? Would this economic policy cause the long term 
impairment of the government's capacity to govern and provide 
stewardship? 
• What is the geographic area that should be represented in decision 
making process? What is the unit to be described? The area actually 
being developed? The immediate neighborhood surrounding the 
development? The borough of Brooklyn? The city of New York? The 
region? 
• Can developers, local governments, and the local community develop new . 
institutions and procedures that permit development and representation of 
local interests and concerns? 
We conclude this paper by discussing ihis last point, the type of representative 
and participatory institutions that could be used to bring public voice into the 
decision making process. In many cases developers of large-scale projects such 
as the Atlantic Yards project do not believe it can survive normal local review 
processes. In the case of the West Side Jets stadium ·and the Nets arena, 
36 Jon Gertner, "Chasing Ground" NY Times Magazine, October 16, 2005 . 
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developers and their governmental allies attempted to circumvent ULURP by 
using state level authorities to circumvent local processes. This is of course the 
practice invented by Robert Moses as he remade the map of New York City in 
the early and mid twentieth century. As Robert Caro described the Moses 
approach in his classic, The Power Broker: 
Operating through an authority, Moses could keep the public from finding 
out what he was doing ... using the wealth of his public authorities to unite 
behind his aims banks, labor unions, contractors, bond underwriters, 
insurance firms, the great retail stores, real estate manipulators ... he made 
the economic forces, not democratic forces the forces that counted in New 
York. The problem of constructing large scale public works in a crowded 
urban setting, where such works impinge on the lives of or displace . 
thousands of voters, is one which democracy has not yet solved.37 
We believe that development politics in the twenty first century makes this 
practice counterproductive. 
What is missing in the current environment is commitment to the process and a 
willingness to abide by its results. Those who do not get their way resort to law 
suits, demonstrations, and political threats to get their way. The time it takes to 
complete the process is unpredictable and there is a well founded suspicion that 
the money to be made in development leads.to a corrupt and often closed 
decision process. On the part of developers, they are risking capital on land and 
design work and are subject to being held up by anyone capable of delaying or 
disrupting construction. 
What is needed is a mature and disciplined review process that provides 
developers and communities with the opportunity to have their interests 
represented. We need a decision making process that allows for creative 
problem solving, compromise and the ability to protect fundamental needs and 
interests. The current process assumes a zero sum game and is designed to 
encourage contending parties to get their way through the exercise of raw power. 
An optimal process would provide an opportunity for a fair airing of views and 
objective analysis of the costs and benefits of specific projects. It would be 
mandatory for all projects, with no ·exceptions. It is not clear that such a process 
is feasible, although from our perspective it would be desirable. 
· 
37 Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker, New York: Knopf Press, 1974. pp.16, 18, 21. 
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